Introduction
Lebanon's existence as an independent state following the end of the French Mandate ) is one that is nominal. Control over Lebanon, both territory and the government, developed into a dynamic conflict which lasted for fifteen years, forcing the collapse of state structures, division of territory, dissolution of monopolised coercion, and the development of a fragmented economy. Lebanon quickly went from being a weak state to a collapsed state at the onset of the Civil War (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) . The central political control of Lebanon came to a standstill as various factions took control over territory through the use of coercion, developed methods of capital extraction, and entrenched identity constructs conducive to maintaining the divisions of the Civil War long after its settlement. Thus the Civil War dramatically altered the state in Lebanon, ultimately forcing the Civil War elites to renegotiate the state by undertaking a process of state formation.
State formation can be explained as the product of, or processes related to, religious work ethic, elite politics, economic development, institutional diffusion, centralisation of social identities, political and territorial stability, colonialism, territorial and political isolation, and war 1 . All of the explanations can be used convincingly depending on the case, but three elements resound from these explanations: the role of capital, coercion, and identity. Moreover, they highlight the underpinnings of the state through military force and internal security; economic extraction and redistribution; and the development of nationalist ideologies. While the application of a European model of state formation to explain state formation in the developing world is often argued to be over simplistic there is also the problem of an argument based on rhetoric of exceptionalism. The arguments against applying such theories to the developing world include fear that it would negate social, cultural, and political histories that are different from the European experience.
However, theories are not a means of prediction, but a framework to be employed to help social scientists understand global phenomenon. Although these histories are important and are markers of difference, there are times when similar conditions are produced in different global environments.
Under these conditions of similarity, I argue that it is possible to use a specific frame 
Tilly and State Formation
Tilly's argument regarding state formation in Europe focuses on the development of state structures through war and the preparations of warfare. Primarily, it is focused on progresses regarding the extraction and redistribution of capital and the monopolisation of coercion by rulers. The emergence of state structures related to capital and coercion allowed rulers to maintain control over the population within a territorial enclave that could be securitised through its coercive forces. Tilly remarks that competition developed over trade and territory, with those who controlled the means of coercion attempting to maintain and increase the total area in which they controlled. 2 Due to increased competition rulers began extracting resources from individuals within the controlled territory; redistributing capital to aid in the development of standing armies that could enforce internal and external security. State formation in Europe therefore centred on four broad conditions: neutralizing competitors within the territory controlled by the rulers;
deterring rivals through war making; the protection of allies inside and outside the controlled territory; and resource extraction that could support the first three activities. 3 An unintended consequence of these conditions was that of the development of state structures and, ultimately, the formation of states.
In applying Tilly's arguments to the contemporary environment of the developing world there are a few caveats that need to be accounted for. The first deals with the environment in which Tilly describes: the pre-state environment of early modern Europe.
Through competition and coercion, mechanisms of control were developed and provided a hierarchical order which permitted instances of domination and subjugation within an overarching anarchical environment. Similarly, this is evident during the Lebanese Civil War when the state collapsed and the various militias acted in manners similar to the pre-state
Europe. The development of competition between the militias necessitated coercive measures that both protected territorial and economic gains and controlled the populations within those territories. The competitive environment that developed after state collapse was one that parallels the anarchic environment of pre-state Europe. With no central control, the militias of the Civil War were playing a game of domination and subjugation.
The second caveat is concerned with the controversial notion that all wars make states and all states make wars. This is a gross misreading of Tilly and he does not claim that the phenomenon of war inherently means that new states will emerge. That does not, however, negate the fact that state transformation can be informed by interstate war. One way in which the state can go through a transformation caused by interstate war in the contemporary period is the strain that is exerted on the national economies of warring states. The pressure of funding war can increase capital extraction by governments, placing the burden on its citizens. Additionally, it is unlikely that once the war has ended that taxation rates will return to pre-war levels. 4 This could affect the state through increased demands by its citizens in regards to structural changes and increased welfare programmes, 5 potentially changing the character of the state.
The third area of contention in applying Tilly's argument to the contemporary period is that the generation of, and focus on, cities that aided in the accumulation of capital and buttressed war-making activities; a component that played an important role in the transformation of polities into states. 6 In the case of Lebanon, the division of Beirut into East formation cannot be applied to developing world states. Nevertheless, Sorensen is too rigid when applying international norms and international public law, which are often breached and are rarely applied if more powerful actors have specific interests and gains to reap through unlawful interventions. Problematically, Sorensen treats individual conflict during pre-state Western Europe as if it were in a black box without the help of allegiances and self-interested third parties. Additionally, he fails to distinguish between internal civil conflict and interstate warfare; the former being integral to understanding the effects of war on state formation, while the latter could produce a variety of other outcomes.
Many of the academics who explore the possibility of applying Tilly's, or a Tilly-esc, approach to the developing world argue that the temporal realities of international politics are a factor that works against the thesis of state-making through war-making. Additionally, they take the phenomenon of war as the independent variable which affects state formation, when in fact, war and the preparations of war should be analysed as an intervening variable which facilitates processes of capital extraction and redistribution, the development of the monopolisation of coercion, and the settlement of statehood through domination or negotiation.
Tilly Applied to Lebanon
Tilly The violent encounters with the state laid the foundations for numerous autonomous groups to emerge and challenge the state as well as each other. 18 Eventually, these groups eroded state power over a plethora of economic and political issues, aiding in the emergence of a system of internal anarchy that exploited societal divisions. The environment of the Lebanese Civil War has therefore provided the rudimentary conditions and variables necessary to apply Tilly's model of state formation.
The institutionalisation of identity politics and sectarianism prior to the outbreak of the Civil
War provided the militias with the capitalists and social connections necessary for exploitation and domination. 19 Because of the institutionalisation of divergent identities within the Lebanese state prior to the Civil War, once the state dissolved, so did the loyalty of its citizens. The identity driven divisions that are highlighted in accounts of the Lebanese Civil War were not a production of the Civil War, but were pre-existing fractures robustly institutionalised during the French
Mandate . The effect of the Civil War on these identities was the facilitation and strengthening of sectarian structures and sectarian antipathies driven by the need to capture the state and secure the survival of the group. 20 Security and survival through domination became a driving force for hierarchical organisation. An outcome of this hierarchical organisation was the bolstering the particular histories that reinforce notions of otherness; 21 consequently using the myths as a rallying point to legitimise their pursuit of the state. 22 As each group stressed its distinct cultural and religious characteristics and their right to state power, they became more inward looking. With the capture of the state in their sights, the militias began to ratchet up the discourse of an existential threat and thus the need for protection by amassing weapons and capital. 23 While this occurred primarily at an elite level, attacks against populations gave way to stronger feelings of animosity at the domestic level; helping to fuel the Civil War into a protracted fifteen year conflict. In exchange for security, citizens gave material and symbolic support to the militias that formed after the state collapsed. Thus creating what Tilly calls connections between power wielders and their social base of support. 24 The internal dynamics at the beginning of the Civil War led many of the militias to consolidate and professionalise within the first year. 25 Similar to the environment described by Tilly, consolidation and professionalization of the militias provided the structure necessary to concentrate the use of force over a given territory and population. unprecedented level of disorder, and they lacked the political finesse of the pre-civil war feudal system, including its established social network. They were, therefore, unable to maintain the same level of social cohesion as the old guard; ultimately, resulting in greater schisms between the poor and the elites. 31 The new capitalists profited from their associations with the militias while those from the lower economic classes greatly remained connected through the provision of security and a vague social order.
The social order that developed was one of connections. The warlords of the Civil War aimed to maintain capital extraction to support their activities and make territorial gains in hopes to capture and consolidate the state vis-à-vis a game of elimination. To do so, the militias had to take predatory postures against the populations they pledged to protect. 32 This predatory posture coupled with mutually beneficial relations with capitalists ensured social organisation under the command of the militias while making territorial gains against their enemies. The collapse of the state, the subsequent development of strong organisations based on sectarian divisions, and the ability to collect resources and capital provided militias with permanent programmes of conflict. mandate that was later extended in 1879. 34 In the meantime, Israel began opening its northern borders to the Maronite villages, and provided weapons to the Druze populations in the mountain ranges, in hopes to form alliances and inject its influence. 35 Syria, unbeknownst to the Maronites, the US, and Israel, used this opportunity to become a dominant force within the Lebanese Civil War, constantly and consistently shifting alliances, and supplying various groups with direct military aid. While Syria was actively mediating between the Lebanese factions after helping defeat the PLO, al-Assad was also sending troops from the Palestinian Liberation Army out into battle under his command. 36 With such powerful players making enormous alliance changes and thus pulling the strings during the civil war, it became even more difficult for any one group to acquire and maintain a monopoly of force and secure significant territorial gains.
Although the argument can be made that intervention was necessary to limit sectariandriven human rights violations, it can also be stated that the funds and military means aided in the violation of human rights by prolonging the conflict. It can be argued that state formation, as outlined by Tilly, following the Civil War failed because of the saturation of capital and the ever increasing means of coercion; the ability to neutralise competition through territorial gains became almost non-existent and perpetuated a system of sabotage rather than domination. Attempts to gain a concentration of capital and the monopoly on the use of force during the Lebanese Civil War devolved into a zero sum game. Large amounts of capital flooded the Civil War economic system and negated many of the advantages that leaders were able to obtain; too many external actors had stakes in the outcome of the war and the survival of specific groups; and no single group was able to capture the state despite producing state-like structures and mechanisms such as professionalised militias, taxation, and redistribution.
Despite the similarities in the environment such as overall anarchy and violent competition with the aim of capturing territory, contemporary state collapse presents problems that were not existent in the analysis of the pre-state environment. These problems include external intervention and economic and military assistance. What was first viewed as a quick conflict to change the status quo of the state turned into a prolonged civil war due to the intervention of external actors and materials. The environment created during the Lebanese Civil War prevented any single group or coalition of groups to capture and secure the state. These differences in environmental conditions from those of pre-state European polities, at first sight, obstructed the type of state formation that Tilly describes. However, in exploring the Civil War and the consolidation of the state afterwards, especially in the case of Lebanon, it is possible to maintain the argument that given the right conditions Tilly's framework of war and state formation applies to non-European states.
The significance of stalemate and the Ta'if
The realities of the Lebanese Civil War, namely the inability for any single group to capture the state, forced the competing militias into a stalemate which was broken with the negotiation of the Ta'if On the other hand, the public secular schools are notorious for their poor quality of education and infrastructure. 43 Because the religious private education is heavily subsidised by political parties or religious charities, they are a popular choice for lowincome families. 44 Politicians and political parties notoriously buttress the private religious schools ensuring that the schools espouse the rhetoric of their financial supporters. Due to the politically lucrative establishment of the sectarian based education system, the public sector remains in dire need of attention.
At a grassroots level, there has been a push to construct a national narrative of reconciliation and national identity. Some of these projects have questioned the sectarian divisions directly, including a commercial by Byblos Bank, and the film by Nadine Labaki titled Where Do We Go Now? The commercial sponsored by Byblos Bank titled Ana Loubnani (I am Lebanese) asks the question "When do we become Lebanese?" after a sequence of individuals stand in front of the Lebanese flag and proclaim their religion. 45 The film by Nadine Labaki addresses the issue of otherness through a story of one village whose men are divided amongst sectarian lines due to external pressure from within the country.
The women in the village take it upon themselves to try to keep the communities together, and when all else fails, they swap their religion to show that they are, in fact, the same. 46 The sentiments regarding the state of the Lebanese state are echoed in the short film directed by Ziad Oakes and produced by Khalil Khatib called A Lunch with Lara Khoury. In the film, a group of young, Lebanese, professionals sitting down for lunch are asked to describe Lebanon in one word. Some of the words used to describe the state include "schizophrenic,"
"chaos," "beautiful," and "home." 47 The emphasis on identity within the culture industry is trying to fill a void that has been entrenched by the politicians and their overarching interest to maintain their seats of power. This void drives the divergent notions of what it means to be Lebanese while attempting to establish a narrative of a single identity; one that has emerged from a history of conflict.
These grassroots movements have continued to have an impact on the state; altering the relationship with and the expectations of the state. In one case, a women's rights organisation, Nasawiya, was throwing a goodbye party for one of their members on the evening of the 28 June, 2013 when the private security forces of Minister Nadim Gemeyal, son of Bachir Gemayel, entered the building to shut down the party. The members of Nasawiya were held at gunpoint for two hours and when they went to the police station the next day to report the incident they were subsequently arrested and detained. The demand for their release was fulfilled once the police, perceived as clients of Gemayel, discerned that the civil protest, growing as news of the events spread, would not back down. 48 Maher al-Meqdad felt that the state was absent or non-existent, the state was quickly able to reassert its authority and al-Meqdad, along with complicit members of the family, were later arrested and charged for forming a militia and the abduction of foreigners. general and the Maronite encampment more specifically. 54 While the argument can be made that the politicisation of the state security forces is evidence of state weakness, it can also be viewed as an institutional step in building sectarian confidence and trust. Through elite cooperation over the security of the various segments of the population, trust can be slowly institutionalised. 55 One example of how this trust has worked out is demonstrated by the LAF and ISF controlling and neutralising circumstances of internal dissidence, including the fighting that occurred at the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in 2007. 56 This exhibits the importance placed on developing a government controlled security force since the end of the Civil War. Although both security services are highly politicised, they do serve the Lebanese state.
The politicisation of the state security forces has also helped to reinforce Hezbollah's position within the state as a resistance force. In the case of Hezbollah, as they were slowly brought in to the legitimate Lebanese political framework, their radical characteristics softened over time. Having since been officially declared as a resistance force in Lebanon, they have -for the most part -remained within these confines. In one particular instance on 7
May, 2008, Hezbollah took Beirut by force in protest over a governmental decision to remove their telecoms systems. 57 The use of force by Hezbollah was seen as an attack against the civilians with some commentators calling it a 'breaking point' and a potential return to civil war in Lebanese politics. 58 The threat of heightened sectarian divisions and discontent over such a short period of time prompted each side to eventually back down. While it is portrayed that the 'breaking point' was a lit fuse to further civil conflict, it also meant that the ruling coalition in the government would have to work with other parties in order to gain internal stability. On the other hand, it also established the rule that the country cannot, literally, be held hostage at gunpoint to the political will of a single party without facing political loss of support.
The increasingly evident new order in state-society relations, the growing power of grassroots organisations, and the increasing trust across sectarian boundaries in the management of state security have been positive steps towards the development of a strong Lebanese state. That is not to say that the reformulation, renegotiation, and development of Lebanon have been easy. An analysis of the Lebanese economy exhibits lacking methods of extraction and redistribution of capital, which, as some argue, has permitted the continuous corruption and politicisation of the economy by fortifying sectarian enclaves. 59 A probable explanation for this is the increase of oil rentier capital that flooded the post-war economic environment; creating a real-estate bubble in certain districts of Beirut and increasing the discrepancy between the rich and the poor. Both the inflation of real-estate prices and the disparities between the rich and poor are problems that have yet to impact the Lebanese government due to the welfare programmes and services offered to the needy by political and sectarian parties. 60 These welfare programmes offered by sectarian groups and political parties help buttress the divisions within the socio-political environment and increase social impetus for individuals to sell their political loyalty in exchange for basic goods such as healthcare, education, electricity, water, and waste management. 61 The method of distribution of these services works for the moment; however, it leaves the central state with a fault line:
uneven economic development and no central method of alleviating the state from this potential political tipping point. 66 The percentage of those living in poverty works out to be roughly 1.2 million Lebanese citizens who are considered poor or extremely poor by international standards. This raises questions regarding the lack of demands directed towards the state concerning the redistribution of capital amongst those living in poverty. This is an important point as many academics continue to look at abject poverty as a source of political mobilisation. 67 Arguably, despite the state not being in a position to offer social welfare programmes that are available through the central governments in most Western states, the political elites, parties, and sectarian groups have been able, and willing to, fill the void; offering, in exchange for political support, goods and services to individuals, who otherwise cannot afford to take part in the neo-liberal economic market. 68 This is an act of balance that is quietly consented to by the government and the actors within government. While it does not benefit a centralised state apparatus it has helped in the acquiescence on Lebanese statehood.
Conclusion
Charles Tilly argues that war and the preparations for war unintentionally brought about the state in Europe. War required rulers to gain access to funds that could support their efforts and establish a standing army that would remain loyal. It meant protecting the territorial dominion of the ruler and assuring that the population consented to be ruled either through legitimacy or force. While the state in Lebanon did not form in the exact pattern that Tilly describes, the consequences of civil war in Lebanon have been that of state formation.
The onset of the Civil War gave way to an environment of internal anarchy that led to increased competition by warring factions. As the war progressed, the factions professionalised into militias, mimicking standing armies, while developing methods of capital extraction and redistribution in order to support their efforts and maintain a soft consent from the population. Due to the circumstances of the war, including external intervention and the influx of foreign capital, the warring factions were eventually locked into a mutually hurting stalemate. As it became clear that such conditions were no longer stable, the Lebanese state consolidated through a process of negotiation between the surviving militias and intervening members of the international community. With the looming history of Civil War influencing instances of political deadlock, the state in Lebanon has become much more amenable to compromise amongst its diverse population and their representatives. While Lebanon shares characteristics similar to the preCivil War period because of the character of its population, it is also vastly different in terms of structure. Although Lebanon did not and has yet to centralise into a state that parallels the central capacity of France or Britain, it does maintain many similarities with the development and emergence of Switzerland. 69 These similarities include civil conflict along with external pressures that consolidated the state -allowing it to be renegotiated and developed through democratic practices such as civil protest.
